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A Defense of the Electoral College  




In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, where Donald J. 
Trump lost the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes but still secured victory 
in the Electoral College, renewed efforts to delegitimize or abolish the Elec-
toral College system have surfaced. 
Critics, calling for a direct national vote for President, attacked the legit-
imacy of the election and decried the Constitution’s method of presidential 
selection as antiquated and undemocratic.  Some legal scholars even sug-
gested that the Electoral College must be abolished to disentangle it from 
America’s racist past and history of slavery.  Recently, though, reformers in 
several States have banded together to promote a pact known as the National 
Popular Vote initiative, an interstate agreement that would assign a State’s 
electoral votes to whichever candidate wins the national popular vote and 
would go into effect as soon as legislation is passed in a sufficient number of 
states to constitute an electoral majority. 
In this Essay, I respond to current criticisms of the Electoral College by 
providing a historical perspective on the Framers’ decision-making through-
out the drafting and ratification process and discuss how the Electoral Col-
lege’s roots in federalism still remain relevant today.  Ultimately, I caution 
against an overreaction to the 2016 election despite the Electoral College’s 
failure to filter out a candidate such as Trump. I argue that the alternative to 
the Electoral College—a system of direct election that would not benefit from 
the state structure to dissipate and diffuse rash popular movements—could be 
even more deleterious to American democracy, as it presents a far higher risk 
of electing a demagogue and falling prey to the tyranny of the majority.  
 
 * Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law; Vis-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For a populist, Donald J. Trump strangely owes his presidential victory 
to a Constitution that limits mass democracy.1 
On Election Day, 65,853,514 Americans voted for the Democratic Party 
ticket of Hillary Clinton for President and Tim Kaine for Vice President.2  
Slightly less, 62,984,828, chose Donald Trump and Mike Pence.3 
But Trump still won, thanks to the Constitution.4  The Founders rejected 
direct popular election of the nation’s Chief Executive.5  Instead, the Consti-
tution requires that voters choose “electors” from their state, who meet to se-
lect a President and Vice President.6  Each state receives electoral votes equal 
to their representation in the House, plus two for their Senators.7  Because of 
the extra two votes, the Electoral College (a phrase nowhere used in the Con-
stitution) gives an advantage to smaller states, which otherwise would be 
swamped by their larger sisters.8  The smallest state in the Union, Wyoming 
(563,767 residents in 2010), receives three electoral votes, while the largest, 
California (37,254,503 residents), receives 55.9 
Trump won the vote of the electors by 304–227.10  While Clinton won a 
plurality of the popular vote, 48.18 percent to Trump’s 46.09 percent, Trump 
 
 1.  See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and Overview, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 966 (2016) (“Americans now fully appreciate that presidential candidates are 
vying for a majority of the Electoral College votes, rather than the individual votes of constituents.”). 
 2.  Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results (2017), FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Jan. 30, 
2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also Nicholas G. Karambelas, The 
Electoral College and the Race to 270, 72 J. MO. B. 260, 260 (2016) (noting that where no candidate 
receives 270 electoral votes, the U.S. House of Representatives elects the president and the Senate 
elects the vice president, rendering the popular vote meaningless).  
 5.  See Goldfeder, supra note 1, at 966–67 (noting that Founders like James Madison, “urged a 
direct national popular vote for President, but this . . . was defeated because the Founders worried it 
would lead to uncertain results”). 
 6.  Id. at 967; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 8.  See generally Karambelas, supra note 4, at 260 (“The term ‘electoral college’ does not appear 
in the Constitution . . . .  Generally, there is one representative for every 500,000 people in a state.”). 
 9.  See William Petrocelli, Voters in Wyoming Have 3.6 Times the Voting Power That I Have.  It’s 
Time to End the Electoral College, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2016, 4:52 PM), https://www.huff-
post.com/entry/its-time-to-end-the-electoral-college_b_12891764.  
 10.  See Federal Elections 2016: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the 
U.S. House of Representatives, FED. ELECTION COMM’N 6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/ 
fe2016/federalelections2016.pdf (last visited March 14, 2019).  
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won by a comfortable 57 percent margin in the Electoral College.11  Even 
though, as we will see, Trump evaded the Framers’ original purpose behind 
the Electoral College, he won fair and square under its modern rules. 
Critics immediately attacked the legitimacy of Trump’s election.  The 
New York Times declared the Constitution’s system for selecting the Presi-
dent “antiquated” and called for a direct national vote for President.12  The 
Electoral College, it argued, “is more than just a vestige of the founding era; 
it is a living symbol of America’s original sin” because it originally advan-
taged slave states in the electoral count.13  In an interview with CNN, Hillary 
Clinton agreed that the electoral college “needs to be eliminated,”14 and 2000 
presidential candidate Al Gore argued that adopting a popular vote for Presi-
dent will “stimulate public participation in the democratic process like nothing 
else we could possibly do.”15  Not to be outdone, retiring Senator Barbara 
Boxer filed a lawsuit to overturn the results of the electoral vote and declared: 
“The Electoral College is an outdated, undemocratic system that does not re-
flect our modern society, and it needs to change immediately.  Every Ameri-
can should be guaranteed that their vote counts.”16 
Critics of the Constitution’s method of presidential selection could appeal 
to an unlikely ally: the winner of the 2016 contest.17  Four years earlier, Trump 
had declared that the Electoral College was “a disaster for democracy.”18  
Shortly after his 2016 victory, the President-elect even conceded: “I would 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  The Editorial Board, Time to End the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/19/opinion/time-to-end-the-electoral-college.html. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Dan Merica, Clinton: It’s Time to Abolish the Electoral College, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 14, 
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/politics/hillary-clinton-anderson-cooper-electoral-college-
cnntv/index.html 
 15.  Rebecca Savransky, Al Gore: End the Electoral College, HILL (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:24 PM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/307966-al-gore-says-he-supports-elimination-of-
electoral-college.  
 16.  Sarah D. Wire, California Sen. Barbara Boxer Files Long Shot Bill to Scrap The Electoral 
College System, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016 10:37 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-
pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-boxer-files-longshot-bill-to-scrap-the-1479234745-htmlstory.html 
(quoting Barbara Boxer). 
 17. See Louis Nelson, Trump Pushes to Swap Electoral College for Popular Vote, POLITICO (April 
26, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/26/trump-electoral-college-popular-
vote-555148 (acknowledging Donald Trump’s support for doing away with the Electoral College for 
presidential elections).  
 18.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:45 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/266038556504494082?lang=en. 
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rather see it where you went with simple votes.  You know, you get 100 mil-
lion votes, and somebody else gets 90 million votes and you win.  There’s a 
reason for doing this because it brings all the states into play.”19  Even as re-
cently as April 2018, Trump called into the morning news show Fox & 
Friends to wish that direct popular vote settled presidential elections, because 
“to me, it’s much easier to win the popular vote.”20  He recognized, however, 
that a direct popular election would demand a different strategy from the elec-
toral college: “I would rather have a popular election, but it’s a totally differ-
ent campaign.  If you’re a runner, you’re practicing for the hundred-yard dash 
as opposed to the mile.”21 
Attacks on the Electoral College after the 2016 election echoed the con-
troversy surrounding the 2000 contest.22  Democratic candidate Al Gore 
barely won the popular vote, 50,999,897 to 50,456,002, a difference of 0.5 
percent.23  But George W. Bush won the Electoral College vote 271 to 266.24  
Only a month-long dispute, and the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore, awarded a 537-vote winning margin in Florida—and an Elec-
toral College majority—to Bush.25  As is the case today, critics of the 2000 
election argued that Bush lacked legitimacy because he had won the Electoral 
College but not the popular vote.26  But while the 2000 election ended up in a 
 
 19.  The Editorial Board, Let the People Pick the President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www. nytimes.com/2017/11/07/opinion/elections-electoral-college-voting.html. 
 20.  George Will, The President Who Knew Too Little About the Electoral College, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (May 3, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/president-trump-elec-
toral-college-complaints-unfounded/. 
 21.  Josiah Peterson, Keep the Electoral College, Because States Matter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 
4, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/electoral-college-important-states-
have-unique-political-interests/.  
 22.  See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair From Day One, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/opinion/the-electoral-college-unfair-from-day-one.html 
[hereinafter Amar, The Electoral College]; Akhil R. Amar, States Don’t Use an Electoral College to 
Choose Their Leader, Neither Should the Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016, 3:20 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/11/16/should-the-electoral-college-be-abolished 
[hereinafter Amar, Neither Should the Nation]. 
 23.  2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,  https://transi-
tion.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last updated Dec. 2001). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curium) (finding that Florida’s “use of stand-
ardless manual recounts” violated the Equal Protection Clause).  
 26.  See Alison Mitchell, Over Some Objections, Congress Certifies Electoral Vote, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 7, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/07/us/over-some-objections-congress-certifies-
electoral-vote.html (“There is overwhelming evidence that George W. Bush did not win this election 
either by national popular vote or the Florida popular vote . . . .”).  
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virtual dead heat, with only 500,000 votes out of 101 million cast separating 
Bush and Gore, the 2016 election decisively awarded the popular vote to Hil-
lary Clinton, who won by a margin of about 3 million votes.27  Trump became 
the fifth President, along with John Quincy Adams (1824), Rutherford Hayes 
(1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), and George W. Bush (2000), to lose the 
popular vote and still enter the White House.28 
There is no doubt that the Constitution’s system for picking the President 
runs against the majoritarian grain.29  It does not appear that any other nation 
uses anything like it.30  The Constitution relies on direct election of other fed-
eral officers, such as members of the House and Senators.31  Nor do the states 
mimic the Constitution.32  The majority (or plurality) of voters choose the na-
tion’s 50 governors and all state legislators.33 
Trump’s 2016 win prompted critics to attribute a more nefarious purpose 
to the Electoral College than simply giving the states a greater say in the cre-
ation of the national government.34  As noted earlier, the New York Times 
editorial board tied the Electoral College to America’s “original sin” of slav-
ery.35  The Times’ charge of racism echoed those by serious legal scholars.  In 
an opinion piece published shortly after Trump’s victory, Yale law professor 
Akhil Amar declared: “Standard civics-class accounts of the Electoral College 
rarely mention the real demon dooming direct national election in 1787 and 
 
 27.  See Federal Elections 2016: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the 
U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 10; Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results 
(2017), supra note 2. 
 28.  See Eva Ball, Presidential Elections and Controversy: A Look Back at Election 2000, 42 
DOCUMENTS TO PEOPLE 8, 9 (2014).  
 29.  See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 481, 
533 (1997) (“[T]he electoral college route to selection of a President . . . [is] evidence that our democ-
racy is not so insistently majoritarian . . . .”).  
 30.  See Drew DeSilver, Among Democracies, U.S. Stands Out in How it Chooses its Head of State, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/22/among-democra-
cies-u-s-stands-out-in-how-it-chooses-its-head-of-state/ (finding that no other democratic nation fills 
its top position the way the U.S. does, with a body of “electors”).  
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII. 
 32.  See, e.g., Governors’ Powers & Authority, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/ 
consulting/powers-and-authority/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (explaining that all state governors are 
popularly elected).  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See, e.g., Amar, Neither Should the Nation, supra note 22.  
 35.  See The Editorial Board, supra note 12.  
[Vol. 46: 833, 2019] A Defense of the Electoral College 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
839 
1803: slavery.”36  Similarly, legal historian Paul Finkelman argued after the 
2000 election that most Americans, and even many experts, have no idea that 
the Framers designed the Electoral College to protect slavery.37 
Accusations of racism follow Trump wherever he goes, but they miss the 
mark here.  As we will see, they stem from a single comment by James Mad-
ison during the secret Philadelphia Convention that drafted the Constitution.38  
Instead of a device infused with racism, the Electoral College emerged as an 
imperfect compromise that sought to balance nationalism with states’ rights, 
to leaven democracy’s passions with deliberation and reason.39  It may seem 
ramshackle to us today, but the Constitution’s method of presidential choice 
sought to advance the voice of the people over the centrifugal forces of feder-
alism and the threat of legislative capture.40 
To overcome this collective action problem, reformers have asked states 
to adopt a National Popular Vote initiative (NPV), in which a state would give 
all of its electoral votes to whoever won a national majority (even if the loser 
won the vote in the state itself).41  For example, if Pennsylvania were to adopt 
the NPV, it would award its electoral votes to a Democrat who won the na-
tional vote, even if a Republican had won the popular vote in Pennsylvania 
itself.42  The NPV pact, however, does not take effect until states representing 
a majority of electoral votes have adopted it, at least 270 electoral votes, and 
it may well fall afoul of the Constitution’s ban on agreements between the 
states without congressional approval.43 
This Essay will proceed in three parts.  Part II will briefly describe the 
 
 36.  Akhil Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists, TIME (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:16 
PM), http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-slavery/. 
 37.  Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 
1147 (2002). 
 38.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56–57 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) 
[hereinafter 2 FERRAND’S RECORDS] (noting that James Madison stated that the people at large were 
the most fit to choose a president, but the serious difficulty was that “[t]he right of suffrage was much 
more diffusive in the Norther than the Southern States”).  
 39. See Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 
1243, 1248 (2012).  
 40.  See Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 
195, 205 (2004) (discussing the Framers’ quickness to compromise on the proposed solution of an 
electoral college because each state would have an equal say).  
 41. See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L 
POPULAR VOTE (July 3, 2018), https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation.  
 42. See id. (explaining that the national popular vote winner would be the candidate “who receives 
the most popular votes from all 50 states and the District of Columbia” on Election Day). 
 43. See id. 
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controversy over the Electoral College.44  Part III will trace the history of the 
drafting and ratification of the Electoral College.45  Part IV will discuss why 
the Electoral College’s roots in federalism still remain relevant today.46 
II. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AT WORK 
If there is a widely held understanding of the Electoral College today, it 
is probably that the Framers took the election of the President out of the hands 
of the people because they distrusted the masses.  Under the old theory that 
the Framers sought to protect the rights of the wealthy, the Framers acted out 
of a fear of democracy’s leveling tendencies.47  Elbridge Gerry, inventor of 
the gerrymander, best expressed this perspective at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion when he declared that “[t]he evils we experience flow from the excess of 
democracy.”48  Gerry did not attack the people’s character, only its innocence: 
“The people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended patriots.”49  As 
a delegate from Massachusetts, Gerry would have held an understandable fear 
of populism after the disorder of Shays’ Rebellion the previous year had 
prompted calls for stronger government.  While debating the Presidency in 
the summer of 1787, Gerry predictably declared: “The popular mode of elect-
ing the Chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all.”50  In his opinion, 
“[t]he people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men.”51 
Imagine what Gerry would have made of Trump, who appealed to the 
pessimistic side of the American people.  We might not blame him for oppos-
ing a popular role in picking a new President, but Gerry lost.  The Framers 
rejected the system under the Articles of Confederation, America’s Constitu-
tion version 1.0, which did not even create an executive office.52  While as-
sembled in the Continental Congress, the states simply chose a presiding 
 
 44. See discussion infra Part II. 
 45. See discussion infra Part III. 
 46. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 47. See Finkelman, supra note 37, at 1148. 
 48. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 2 FERRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 57. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777; Continental Congress, 6 CONST. REV. 148, 
156 (1922). 
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officer of few powers for administrative convenience.53  The Framers also shot 
down proposals in the Constitutional Convention to allow the states to select 
the President directly or through the Senate.  They also deleted from the first 
draft of the Constitution direct selection of the Chief Executive by the legis-
lature.  Properly understood, the Electoral College advanced, rather than de-
nied, democracy. 
Criticism has long followed the Electoral College, and sporadic efforts to 
change it have come close to success.  After the election of Richard Nixon, 
for example, the American Bar Association declared that the “electoral col-
lege method of electing a President of the United States is archaic, undemo-
cratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous.”54  A half-century before 
Trump’s election, the controversies over John F. Kennedy’s close 1960 mar-
gin and George Wallace’s 1968 third-party candidacy led to the strongest 
movement in our history to discard the Constitution’s original electoral sys-
tem.55  A proposal to amend the Constitution to a direct election system even 
overwhelmingly passed the House by 339 to 70, and supporters claimed polls 
showed that an amendment had the support of roughly two thirds of state leg-
islators.56  But ever since the Twelfth Amendment, enacted after the election 
of 1800 to separate the votes for President and Vice President, the United 
States has never seen fit to alter its method for choosing Presidents. 
Criticism, however, has long followed the Electoral College.  Its primary 
vulnerability, of course, is that it selects Presidents not chosen by a majority 
of the American people.57  While in most cases the Electoral College has 
reached the same outcome, a number of our modern Presidents have still won 
the Oval Office without a majority.58  This includes not just presidents who 
lost to winners of the majority vote, such as Donald Trump and George W. 
Bush, but also those who captured only a plurality, such as Bill Clinton 
(twice), Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Richard Nixon.  Some of our 
most consequential Presidents have won in this way, such as Abraham 
 
 53. Continental Congress, 6 CONST. REV. 148, 156 (1922). 
 54. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON ELECTORAL REFORM 4 (1967). 
 55. See JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 18–20 (1971). 
 56. Id. at 20. 
 57. THOMAS H. NEALE, ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 5–7 (2017). 
 58. Id. at 7. 
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Lincoln in 1860 and Woodrow Wilson in 1912.59  A majority vote system may 
not have produced the best outcomes for the nation if it had kept Abraham 
Lincoln and Harry Truman out of the White House. 
Then there is the possible randomness of the system.  If a third-party can-
didate can deprive a winner of an Electoral College majority, the choice could 
go to the House, where states vote by delegation.60  The House could select a 
candidate who also does not represent the majority of the population, and the 
choice could fall prey to legislative deal-making.61  In 1824, even though An-
drew Jackson won the most electoral votes, he did not have a majority.  When 
the election went to the House, it chose John Quincy Adams instead, with 
Henry Clay allegedly throwing the support of his party to Adams in exchange 
for appointment as Secretary of State.  Small states have an equal vote with 
large states, amplifying even further the pro-federalism structure of the presi-
dential selection process at the expense of majoritarianism.62 
The system also relies on a certain randomness in its operation.  In our 
winner-take-all system (a product of state law), candidates will not campaign 
in states where a large majority favors them or their opponent.  Trump did not 
challenge Hillary Clinton in California, where Democrats had a majority in 
the millions, while Clinton did not contest Texas.63  Candidates ignored other 
states with large populations that heavily favored one party or the other—New 
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts saw little of Trump or Clinton.64  Candidates 
instead will focus their competition on states where the election is close.65  
Most of the election budgets will go toward the states which combine electoral 
votes with competitiveness.66  In the 2016 election, the candidates devoted a 
large portion of their spending to “battleground” states such as Florida, Ohio, 
 
 59.  See Historical Election Results, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://www.archives 
.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 61. See NEALE, supra note 57, at 8 (stating that critics argue that in contingent election situations, 
the members of the House can exercise their choice “without regard to the winners of the popular vote 
in their district, states, or in the nation at large”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see NEALE, supra note 57, at 11. 
 63. See Matthew Conlen, The Last 10 Weeks of 2016 Campaign Stops in One Handy Gif, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 16, 2016, 3:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-last-10-weeks-
of-2016-campaign-stops-in-one-handy-gif/. 
 64.  See NEALE, supra note 57, at 13. 
 65. See id. at 4 n.18.  
 66. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Count ‘Em, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2006), https://www.newyorker 
.com/magazine/2006/03/06/count-em-2 (reporting that in the 2004 election, the candidates spent a to-
tal of $237 million on advertising, with $229 million of it spent in the thirteen battleground states).  
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and Pennsylvania.67  Battleground states may have little importance to the na-
tion as a whole or bear similarity to the country’s majority, while states with 
large populations might go unnoticed.68 
When it comes to the nation’s most powerful office, the majority does not 
necessarily pick the winner.  A strategic candidate could win bare popular 
majorities in enough states to carry the Electoral College, but then lose by 
large margins in the most populous states.69  According to the 2010 census, 
about half of the American population lives in the largest eight states (Cali-
fornia, Texas, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and Georgia), 
but those states represent only 225 out of the 270 electoral votes needed to 
win.70  A candidate could assemble the electoral votes of the smallest states 
and essentially concede in the largest states, and still prevail.71  Whether by 
intention or luck, Trump now sits in the Oval Office by following such a 
plan.72  Though he won in Texas and Florida, Trump did not contest Califor-
nia, New York, or Illinois.73  The state-based allocation of electoral votes, and 
the extra two electoral votes for every state, create the possibility of losing the 
popular vote but winning the election.74 
The American political system need not allow the Constitution to produce 
 
 67.  See Anthony Terrell, Trump Out-Campaigned Clinton by 50 Percent in Key Battleground 
States in Final Stretch, NBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics 
/2016-election/trump-out-campaigned-clinton-50-percent-key-battlegrounds-final-100-n683116.  
 68. See Hertzberg, supra note 66. 
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three biggest “blue wall” states, meaning those states that consistently vote for Democratic Party can-
didates in presidential elections).  
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such a result.  Presidential candidates could always commit to conceding the 
election, no matter the Electoral College result, should they lose the popular 
vote.75  It is difficult to imagine an Electoral College winner, given the power 
of the modern American presidency, living up to such a principle, just as Don-
ald Trump could not follow through on his 2012 words. 
But political reform need not rely simply on the candidates.  The key rea-
son why the Electoral College can choose a President who loses the popular 
vote rests in federalism.  Article II of the Constitution mandates that “Each 
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors.”76  In the earliest American elections, states used a vari-
ety of methods for choosing electors, ranging from direct election to selection 
by the state legislatures themselves.77  While the South Carolina legislature 
would continue to choose electors until the Civil War, most states soon al-
lowed the popular vote to select the electors.78  But the states also adopted a 
rule that reinforced the partially federal, partially state nature of the constitu-
tional system.79  Most states follow a winner-take-all rule, also known as the 
“unit” rule, which gives all of a state’s electoral votes to the winner of the 
statewide popular vote.80  Win a plurality of the popular vote within enough 
states that hold 270 electoral votes, and a candidate wins the election, even 
without a national majority.81 
States, therefore, have it in their hands to prevent another Donald Trump 
from ever winning a presidential election with a minority.  States could allo-
cate their electoral votes proportionally, so that if a Democrat were to win 
Pennsylvania by 60–40 percent, the state would divide its 20 votes and give 
12 electoral votes to the Democrat and eight to the Republican.82  Only two 
states, Maine and Nebraska, however, divide their votes proportionally.83  But 
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states realize that were they to adopt such a rule, candidates would shift their 
time and resources to states where they have a chance to win all of the elec-
toral votes.84  It is the states (both big and small), rather than the Constitution, 
which maintains a system that allows a candidate to win the Electoral College 
without winning the nationwide majority vote.85 
In the wake of the 2000 and 2016 elections, a new criticism has arisen.  
According to leading legal scholars, regardless of its anti-majoritarian tenden-
cies, the Electoral College also advances a racist agenda through its protection 
of slavery.86  “[T]he records of the Convention show that in fact the connec-
tion between slavery and the college was deliberate, and very much on the 
minds of many delegates, including James Madison,” argues legal historian 
Paul Finkelman.87  Because of the Electoral College’s inclusion of the three-
fifth’s rule, Amar notes, Virginia started out with 12 out of the first 91 elec-
toral votes; even though Pennsylvania by 1800 would have 10 percent more 
free people than Virginia, it would have 20 percent less electoral votes.88  
“Perversely, the more slaves Virginia (or any other slave state) bought or bred, 
the more electoral votes it would receive.”89  Indeed, as Amar notes, a south-
ern state that freed slaves who left for the North would actually lose electoral 
votes.90  Finkelman observes that John Adams would have won the tight elec-
tion of 1800 over Thomas Jefferson if the Constitution had not incorporated 
the three-fifths rule into the Electoral College.91  Amar agrees: “Jefferson met-
aphorically rode into the executive mansion on the backs of slaves.”92 
This relatively new claim not only has risen to attack the Trump presi-
dency, but it also undermines the legitimacy of the system we have used for 
more than two centuries to choose our presidents.  It gives an added impetus 
to efforts to replace the Electoral College with some kind of national direct 
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election of the President, though majoritarianism has not always been the best 
friend of minority rights.  The next Part will describe the development of the 
Electoral College during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to 
show that race had relatively little to do with it.93  While a stray comment in 
the Philadelphia Convention may have pointed out the benefits to the southern 
states of the Electoral College system, this point did not seem to come to the 
attention of those who ratified the Constitution.94  Further, any benefit would 
have disappeared with the erasure of the Constitution’s protection for slavery 
in the Reconstruction Amendments.95  It is to that history that we now turn. 
III. THE DEBATES THAT CREATED THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
The Electoral College, for all of its ramshackle nature, provoked little de-
bate during the process of the Constitution’s approval in 1788.  “The mode of 
appointment of the Chief Magistrate,” Alexander Hamilton observed in Fed-
eralist 68, “is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which 
has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark 
of approbation from its opponents.”96  Hamilton, who argued openly for an 
energetic executive of independent powers, even declared: “I venture some-
what further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, 
it is at least excellent.”97 
Hamilton may have accurately described the ratification process, in which 
the Constitution went before each state’s specially-elected conventions.  Crit-
ics of the new framework for government devoted most of their energies at-
tacking the expansion of federal authority at the expense of the states, the 
Senate’s strange mixture of roles, or the powers of the new presidency.98  An-
tifederalists did not spend much effort on the Electoral College.99  If there 
were a purpose to defend slavery or racism in the Constitution’s system for 
selecting its Chief Executive, it did not garner much notice or debate during 
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the ratification, which was the process that actually gave the Constitution its 
legal and political authority.100 
But Hamilton’s words could not fairly describe the Constitutional Con-
vention.  Meeting in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, delegates from the 
states secretly drafted a new framework for the national American govern-
ment.101  The mechanism of presidential selection balanced many of the same 
competing forces that affected the design of the rest of the Constitution: the 
struggle between big states and little states, nationalism versus federalism, 
North versus South, free states versus slave.102  In the course of a few months, 
the Framers would consider a wide range of ways to select a President.  The 
Electoral College represents their improvement on the Articles of Confedera-
tion, but with the compromises necessary for broad approval. 
Early proposals for the Constitution would have created a system not un-
like the parliamentary democracies of western Europe.  Drafted by James 
Madison and introduced by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, 
1787, the Virginia Plan created a national executive to “be chosen by the Na-
tional Legislature.”103  The delegates swiftly set out the same competing vi-
sions for presidential selection which endure today.  When discussion of the 
Virginia Plan began on June 1, Pennsylvania delegate and future Supreme 
Court Justice James Wilson argued that “in theory he was for an election by 
the people.”104  He pointed to the experience in Massachusetts and New York, 
which showed “that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, 
was both a convenient [and] successful mode.”105  Roger Sherman of Con-
necticut took immediate exception.106  He “was for the appointment by the 
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body.”107 
If Sherman and the Virginia Plan had prevailed, the American executive 
would look similar, if not identical, to a European democracy.  In these par-
liamentary systems, the majority party of the legislature chooses a prime min-
ister who heads the executive—there is no true separation of powers between 
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the two branches.  Many of the Framers, however, believed that legislative 
control over the executive in the revolutionary state constitutions had pro-
duced unstable and unfair laws, government favoritism and partisanship, and 
flagrant abuse of property and contract rights.108  To reduce congressional in-
fluence over the President, George Mason persuaded the Convention to limit 
the executive to a single seven-year term, without possibility of re-election.109  
But Mason hit roadblocks with his effort to remove the legislature from the 
process of electing the President.  He proposed the first version of the Elec-
toral College: the Constitution would divide the states into districts, which 
would select “[m]embers for their respective districts to be electors of the Ex-
ecutive [Magistry].”110  His motion, however, failed 7–2 (with one abstention), 
and the Convention kept to its plan that the legislature elect the president by 
an 8–2 vote.111 
Representatives from the smaller states had even more plans in store for 
the presidency.112  With their New Jersey Plan, introduced on June 15, these 
delegates proposed that each state have equal representation in the Congress, 
and that no house exist with seats allocation by population.113  The conflict 
between large and small states paralyzed the Constitutional Convention for a 
month.114  When it ended in the Great Compromise, the smaller states had won 
a significant change to the centrality of a popularly-elected legislature in the 
Virginia Plan.115  The Senate, in which each state received two senators, be-
came the central institution in the legislature.116  Legislation could not pass 
without its cooperation; presidents could not make treaties or appoint judges 
and high officers without its advice and consent; a constitutional amendment 
could not go to the states without the agreement of two-thirds of the senators; 
and, it acted as the judge and jury in impeachment trials.117  The rise of the 
Senate gave the states an effective veto over Congress’s election of the 
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President. 
Large state delegates spent the remainder of the Constitutional Conven-
tion attempting to restore the popular voice in the Constitution.  As I have 
argued elsewhere, nationalists at this point began to shift authority away from 
the Senate to the President.118  They also sought to break presidential depend-
ency on Congress.  Re-opening debate over presidential selection on July 17, 
Gouverneur Morris demanded that the President “ought to be elected by the 
people at large, by the freeholders of the Country,” who would “never fail to 
prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might 
so speak, of continental reputation.”119  If Congress selected him, on the other 
hand, “[h]e will be the mere creature of the Legisl[ature]” and the choice 
would be “the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction.”120  In response to 
delegates worried that a majority of the American people would not agree on 
a single candidate, Wilson proposed sending such deadlocks to Congress. 
Opponents of the majoritarian revival stressed several concerns that have 
resurfaced in the Trump years.  Sherman argued that the people would “never 
be sufficiently informed” and would tend to choose candidates from their own 
states, which would give larger states the advantage.121  Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina feared “a few active & designing men”—demagogues—
would manipulate the people, or that “[t]he most populous States by combin-
ing in favor of the same individual will be able to carry their points.”122  Even 
though from a large state, Virginian George Mason agreed that “the extent of 
the Country” made it nearly impossible for the people to “have the requisite 
capacity” to judge the candidates.123  “[I]t would be as unnatural to refer the 
choice of a proper character for a chief Magistrate to the people,” Mason de-
clared, “as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man.”124  Mason’s 
statement often supplies the evidence for those who believe that the Electoral 
College advanced an anti-democratic agenda.125  While Mason may well have 
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held such views, he arguably did not influence the Constitution as he refused 
to sign the final product and became one of its leading opponents during the 
ratification.126 
It was only at the close of this phase of the debate that the issue of race 
that has so obsessed today’s Electoral College critics first emerged.  Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina rose to support Mason’s arguments that most 
voters would not have the knowledge, due to the size of the nation, to choose 
knowledgeably among multiple candidates.127  Comparing election by the 
people with election by the legislature, he said, was like comparing “app[oint-
ment] by lot, and by choice.”128  He worried that because of the lack of infor-
mation, voters would generally choose candidates from their states, which 
would give large states the advantage.129  Invoking the advantage of slavery, 
Williamson declared: “This will not be Virg[ini]a however.  Her slaves will 
have no suffrage.”130  He was pointing out a comparative loss of power for the 
slave states under Morris’s plan.  Infamously, the Great Compromise included 
three-fifths of slaves in a state’s population for allocating seats in the House 
of Representatives, even though the South did not allow them to vote.  But if 
the Constitution allowed for the direct election of the president, the southern 
states would lose that three-fifths advantage, which only applied to the 
makeup of Congress.131  After Williamson spoke, the Convention rejected 
Morris’s motion and unanimously affirmed legislative election of the presi-
dent.132 
The delegates, however, quickly backtracked out of concerns over exec-
utive independence.133  Just two days after rejecting Morris and Wilson’s pleas 
for direct election, the Convention made the choices that set the Electoral Col-
lege in its final form.134  Initially, they decided that the single seven-year term 
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for a president would lower the incentives for success created by the prospect 
of re-election.135  They began by lifting the single term limit.136  But once they 
made a president re-eligible for election, they worried that he would seek ways 
to please the legislature, which would control his re-appointment.137  Re-open-
ing the battle he had just lost, Morris again moved for the direct election of 
the president.138  “If he is to be the Guardian of the people let him be appointed 
by the people[.]”139  Like others stung by experience under the state revolu-
tionary constitutions, Morris believed that unrestrained legislatures posed the 
greater threat to the people’s liberties.140  “[T]he Executive Magistrate should 
be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, a[gainst] Legislative 
tyranny . . . .”141  With the President eligible for re-election, a majority of the 
delegates agreed with Morris that Congress should no longer hold the power 
of appointment because it would make the executive dependent on the legis-
lature.142  “[A] dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render 
it the Execut[ive] as well as the maker of laws[,]” Madison observed at this 
point in the debate.143  “[T]hen according to the observation of Montesquieu, 
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical man-
ner.”144 
Madison joined Wilson’s solution to subject presidential selection to pop-
ular choice, but in doing so also brought race back to the surface.145  Because 
legislative selection would introduce “intrigues and contentions” that would 
produce “an improper connection between the two departments,” Madison 
concluded that “[t]he people at large,” were “as likely as any that could be 
devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character.”146  
But popular election created an important “difficulty.”147  The northern states 
had granted the right to vote more broadly than the southern states, “and the 
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latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”148  
To maintain the South’s population advantage due to the counting of three-
fifths of the slaves, Madison declared that “[t]he substitution of electors obvi-
ated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to the fewest objec-
tions.”149  By a 6–3 vote on July 19, 1787, the Convention approved a motion 
by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut to replace legislative selection with an 
electoral college system.150 
Critics of the Electoral College consider this critical vote to reveal the 
desire of the Framers to advantage slavery, and hence introduce racism into 
the Constitution.151  This racism critique, however, does not comport with the 
manner in which the Framers actually voted.  Of course, Williamson and Mad-
ison argued that direct popular election of the President would work to the 
disadvantage of the southern states, compared to legislative election, while an 
elector system would restore the balance.152  But in the July 19 vote first adopt-
ing the Electoral College system, the delegates did not vote along slavery 
lines.153  Paterson, who proposed the system, represented the free state of New 
Jersey and was an abolitionist.154  Pointing out that the Articles of Confedera-
tion “had been ashamed to use the term ‘Slaves’ & had substituted a descrip-
tion,” he had helped persuade the Convention to give Congress the power to 
ban the slave trade after 1808.155  Paterson certainly would not have proposed 
a system to give the southern states greater power for racist reasons.156  When 
it came time to vote, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia approved the replacement of legislative choice with special elec-
tors.157  Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina voted against.158  The 
free states voted unanimously for the electoral system, but so did Virginia, the 
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leading slave state.159  Three slave states voted against, which directly under-
mines the claim that racism drove approval of the Electoral College.160  The 
vote also breaks down along North versus South, but again, the leading state 
of the South, Virginia, voted for the electors.161 
Another factor that often goes unaddressed is that this July 19 vote oc-
curred about two months before final adoption of the electoral system.162  
Leading legal scholars often end their account of the Framers’ design of the 
Electoral College with this decision, but neglect its development in a more 
democratic direction.163  For example, almost immediately after the July 19 
vote, the Convention reversed course 180 degrees to restore congressional 
election of the president,164 and even reconsidered again a single term limit, 
and a period in office of anywhere from six to twenty years.165  Debate began 
to roam all over the map, with one delegate proposing a three-person presi-
dency, with one representative from each region of the nation, another sug-
gesting that a subcommittee of Congress pick the president, and another rec-
ommending that the choice fall to state governors.166 
During these wanderings, Madison again urged the use of electors, but 
this time Madison did not mention the slave state advantage in an electoral 
system.167  He continued his opposition to congressional elections, which he 
worried would “agitate & divide the legislature,” lead to “intrigue” between 
the president and the dominant majority in Congress, or provide an opening 
for interference from abroad.168  It also made little sense to grant Congress the 
power to choose the executive: “One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as it 
would have a negative on the laws, was to control the Natl. Legislature  
. . . .”169  Rather, Madison stressed that electors “chosen for the occasion, 
would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment,” which he 
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predicted “would [provide] very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption.”170  
But if the Convention continued to reject an Electoral College, Madison be-
lieved the only alternative was direct popular election, despite the voters’ lack 
of information on candidate nationwide and their favoritism toward local 
sons.171  “With all its imperfections he liked this best.”172  In fact, Madison 
conceded that the North would outweigh the South in numbers of voters 
(though he believed that the South’s population would grow), but as a South-
erner “he was willing to make the sacrifice.”173  Nevertheless, the Convention 
continued to reject amendments to lengthen the presidential term in office and 
to limit re-eligibility.174 
Madison’s defense of popular election did not win any converts.175  “A 
popular election in this case is radically vicious,” Gerry argued on July 25, 
because “the ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one 
set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert” to prevail, such 
as the Order of the Cincinnati.176  However, support continued to build for 
electors because of concern over executive independence from the legisla-
ture.177  “The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence 
from abroad,” Pierce Butler of South Carolina declared.178  “It will be difficult 
to avoid either if the Election be made by the National Legislature.”179  “On 
the other hand, the Gov[ernment] should not be made so complex & unwieldy 
as to disgust the States,” Butler warned.  “This would be the case, if the elec-
tion [should] be referred to the people.”180  The best way to accommodate state 
interests was election by electors chosen by the states, he concluded.181  Morris 
again attacked “the undue influence of the Legislature.”182  He “considered an 
election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode.”183  
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Morris therefore “could not but favor the idea of” electors.184  But when the 
delegates took a break and created a Committee of Detail to transform their 
deliberations into a unified draft, they still supported congressional election 
of the president (by a 7–3 vote), though for a single seven-year term.185 
When the Committee on Detail reported its draft of the Constitution, the 
delegates occupied themselves with debates over the congressional process 
for choosing the president.186  But then, at the end of their deliberations, on 
August 31, Morris suddenly moved to strike out the draft’s authorization for 
Congress to choose the president.187  He prevailed by the extraordinary vote 
of 9–1, with one abstention.188  The debates contain no explanation why, but 
as Stanford historian Jack Rakove has argued, “a growing reaction against the 
Senate worked in favor of the presidency, encouraging those framers who op-
posed legislative election and favored re-eligibility to renew their efforts.”189  
In other words, as the delegates understood that the body representing the 
states would have a veto over most powers of the federal government—the 
passage of laws, the confirmation of executive officers and judges, the adop-
tion of treaties—the nationalists among them sought to free the President from 
its grasp.190  With no method for choosing the president in the working draft, 
the delegates sent the question to the well-named Committee on Unfinished 
Parts for decision.191 
On September 4, the Committee returned with today’s Electoral College, 
though with the Senate serving as the backup method should no candidate win 
a majority.192  The delegates observed that an Electoral College would reduce 
the chances for intrigue and corruption because it would come into being only 
to select a president and then disband.193  It would eliminate presidential de-
pendence on Congress through the promise of appointment.194  It did not 
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disrupt the fundamental bargain made between the large and small states over 
Congress by allocating electoral vote by population, giving the state legisla-
tures the right to choose, and giving each state two additional votes.195  In 
defending the committee’s work, Morris explained that “[no one] had ap-
peared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature” and “many 
were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people.”196  Relying on 
electors would address “the danger of intrigue & faction if the appoinm[en]t 
should be made by the Legislature” and “the indispensable necessity of mak-
ing the Executive independent of the Legislature.”197  Mason praised the new 
system because it “removed some capital objections, particularly the danger 
of cabal and corruption.”198  The Convention rejected every proposal to restore 
the choice to the legislature, but also voted 10–1 to give the House—voting 
by state delegation—the power to choose the president should the Electoral 
College fail to agree.199 
When the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention explained their work 
to the state conventions responsible for ratifying the Constitution, they fairly 
described the different values they balanced.200  But they also argued that the 
Electoral College would produce presidents of leading character and filter out 
the unsuitable.201  Here, Trump’s election demonstrated that the process did 
guarantee the substance. 
When the Constitution went to the states for approval, the issue that had 
so beset the Philadelphia delegates did not trigger a widespread outcry.202  In 
fact, as Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 68, the Electoral College 
was the only important part of the Constitution to have “escaped without se-
vere censure” and had not “received the slightest mark of approbation from 
its opponents.”203  Hamilton, for once, agreed with the Anti-Federalists that 
“if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent.”204  Indeed, most 
Anti-Federalist objections to the presidency focused on its substantive 
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powers, not the method for its selection, or likely collusion between the exec-
utive branch and the Senate to seize power.205  George Mason’s Objections to 
the Constitution, a leading Anti-Federalist critique widely circulated in Sep-
tember 1787, does not even mention the Electoral College.206  To the extent 
that they attacked it, Anti-Federalists worried more about the chances for for-
eign bribery of the electors or the President himself, rather than racism or state 
advantages in the system.207 
Hamilton fairly reported the values that had guided the delegates, though 
he left out the heated arguments and the many shifts of position.  Democracy 
remained the guiding principle.208  “It was desirable that the sense of the peo-
ple should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust 
was to be confided,” he wrote in The Federalist No. 68.209  But in order to 
foster deliberation and access the broadest knowledge, the Constitution placed 
the choice in the hands of electors who “will be most likely to possess the 
information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.”210  
Mediating the choice through the electors, Hamilton predicted, would also 
“afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder”––unregulated 
passion, in other words.211 
Hamilton also repeated the reasons for removing the choice from the leg-
islature.212  He argued that the Electoral College would prevent the “cabal, 
intrigue, and corruption” that would arise if Congress were to choose.213  Ham-
ilton argued, as did his fellow nationalists in the Constitutional Convention, 
that Congress would be the seat of such conspiracies, and hence the Presi-
dency should be made independent of it.214  The Philadelphia delegates “have 
not made the appointment of the president to depend on [any] pre-existing 
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bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their 
votes,” but instead vested the power into a group of electors chosen “for the 
temporary and sole purpose” of selecting the president.215  Choice by electors 
would also support the president’s continuing independence from Congress, 
rather than “sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favour was 
necessary” for his continuance in office.216  By rejecting legislative selection 
of the president, the Electoral College advanced the fundamental principle that 
“the executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all, but 
the people themselves.”217 
The Federalists, however, failed in their predictions that this system not 
only would prevent “cabal, intrigue, and corruption,” but would also produce 
Presidents of the highest caliber.218  “This process of election affords a moral 
certainty,” Hamilton promised, “that the office of President will seldom fall 
to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the req-
uisite qualifications.”219  Hamilton’s praise for the Constitution here certainly 
went too far.220  “It will not be too strong to say,” he wrote, “that there will be 
a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for 
ability and virtue.”221  The Federalists did not clearly explain why the Elec-
toral College would produce such high characters.222  They may have relied 
on the widespread understanding that George Washington would be the first 
president.  As Pierce Butler wrote afterward, he did not believe that the Pres-
ident’s powers “would have been so great had not many of the members [at 
Philadelphia] cast their eyes towards General Washington as President; and 
shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions 
of his Virtue.”223  They may have further assumed that only the truly outstand-
ing characters would have the continent-wide reputation, in an age of poor 
communications, to win an Electoral College majority.224 
But the Framers did not anticipate that the Electoral College would 
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establish a framework that created room for other purposes to assume a role.  
While more majoritarian than congressional or Senate selection of the presi-
dent, the Electoral College advanced the primary objective of the Framers to 
reduce the ability of faction or party to control the government for its own 
ends.  It was of a piece with other mechanisms, most notably the Senate and 
the judiciary, designed to decentralize and diffuse power over domestic issues 
within the federal government.  Others, such as Thomas Jefferson, Martin van 
Buren, and most especially Woodrow Wilson, would use party government to 
modify the Framers’ design.  It is their innovations that have given us a selec-
tion system that elevates the president through a quasi-plebiscitary process in 
which political parties cooperate to advance a political platform adopted in a 
nationwide election. 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
Rather than a racist institution, the Electoral College advanced a more 
democratic voice in the selection of the president.  We should not forget that 
the Framers started from a baseline—the Articles of Confederation—which 
gave all important decisions to the states.  Their first proposal for legislative 
selection would have created a more democratic executive, but one too sub-
servient to Congress.  Delegates who supported a powerful, independent pres-
ident, such as Madison, Morris, and Wilson, pressed for direct popular elec-
tion.  But they could not overcome the concerns of delegates such as Mason, 
who feared that limited communications and the vast size of the country would 
prevent voters from making an educated choice.  Nevertheless, the Framers 
reached a compromise in the Electoral College which balanced nationalism 
with federalism.  But unlike the Great Compromise over the makeup of the 
House and Senate, the nationalists prevailed in centering the selection of the 
president in popular choice, but mediated through the states.  Democracy op-
erates to choose the president, but within the states.  “Thus[,] the essential 
spirit of the Electoral College, like that of the Constitution in general, was 
fundamentally democratic from the outset,” observed political scientist Mar-
tin Diamond.225 
Criticism that the Framers intentionally designed the Electoral College, 
in the words of Amar, to “advantage Southern white male propertied 
 
 225.  MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 6 
(1977). 
[Vol. 46: 833, 2019] A Defense of the Electoral College 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
860 
slaveholders in the antebellum era” seems off the mark.226  Instead, the Found-
ers believed that their unusual system would organize democracy through the 
states.227  If we should discard with the Electoral College as an obstacle to the 
majority, critics should explain why the American people should retain the 
Constitution’s other limits on pure majoritarian democracy.  The separation 
of powers, for example, handicaps Washington, D.C.’s ability to govern.228  
Why not replace it with a British-style parliament, where the head of the ma-
jority party in Congress would form a cabinet of fellow members to control 
the executive agencies?  Federalism further restricts national powers.229  Why 
not follow European models again and replace the states with administrative 
districts subordinate to the national government?  Judicial review and the Bill 
of Rights, for that matter, also poses limits on the majority.  We could again 
follow modern Britain and leave the creation and definition of individual lib-
erties to the legislature. 
The same charges that critics bring against the Electoral College apply to 
Congress as well.  Amar’s and Finkelman’s claim that the Electoral College 
rests on racist foundations have force only because it incorporated the same 
three-fifths rule that applied to the allocation of House seats.230  But the Civil 
War and the constitutional settlement that followed, codified in the Thirteenth 
(ending slavery), Fourteenth (recognizing equal protection and due process of 
law), and Fifteenth Amendments (guaranteeing the right to vote), ended the 
three-fifths rule and extirpated the formal legal influence of slavery.231  Today 
we commonly think of the House as the most democratically accountable and 
responsive element of the federal government, even though the Constitution 
continues to allocate seats by state.232  Reconstruction ended the advantage of 
the slave states in the Electoral College as well.233  A century would pass until 
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a son of the South would win the presidency.  In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson 
won his great victory in the outpouring of grief after the Kennedy assassina-
tion.234  Woodrow Wilson, the only other president from the South, had spent 
his professional career in the North, receiving his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins, 
taught at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan, and Princeton, and served as President of 
Princeton and Governor of New Jersey.235 
Of course, the Framers gave an advantage to the states in selecting the 
Chief Executive.  Recently, that difference has not mattered, except in close 
contests, such as the 2000 and 2016 elections.  But the Electoral College’s 
departure from the principle of “one person, one vote,” first required by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, grates on modern democratic 
sensibilities.236  “I believe strongly that in a democracy, we should respect the 
will of the people,” Hillary Clinton had said after the 2000 election, “and to 
me that means it’s time to do away with the Electoral College and move to the 
popular election of our president.”237  While Trump might have won the pres-
idency had the Framers chosen direct popular election, that results seems un-
likely in light of Clinton’s large majorities in major American cities.238  Fed-
eralism clearly worked to Trump’s advantage. 
But if critics dislike the amplified voice of the states, they have much 
more to worry about than the Electoral College.  Consider the Constitution 
itself: It did not take effect by a simple nationwide majority vote.  Instead, it 
adopted a procedure for its own ratification more similar to the Electoral Col-
lege than any other form of lawmaking.  Article VII required nine out of the 
thirteen states approve the Constitution, using special conventions called 
solely for the purpose.239  No state ratified the document through its legisla-
ture, nor did any state have a direct plebiscite to approve the Constitution.  
Much like a presidential election, the ratification of the Constitution turned on 
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assembling a majority coalition within each state, with its own unique political 
history and culture, and then combining them into the required nine states.240  
Amending the Constitution repeats the same combination of federal and state 
approval.  Once two-thirds of Congress passes an amendment, it goes to the 
states for ratification by three-quarters. 
Indeed, the Constitution channels and limits majority rule throughout its 
basic structure.  The Electoral College may have allowed the states to choose 
Trump because of the small difference in the popular vote.  But the states 
enjoy an even greater advantage in the national government in the Senate, 
where state equality gives the same number of votes to Wyoming, with its 
563,767 residents, as to California, with 37,254,503 residents.241  The Framers 
routed all of Congress’s important powers through the Senate, and hence gave 
the states a veto over most major federal policies.242  Washington, D.C. cannot 
pass laws, raise taxes, or spend money without approval by the representatives 
of the states.  The president cannot appoint any judges, cabinet members, or 
principal government officers without the Senate, nor can he make any treaties 
without its advice and consent.  The Constitution established these superma-
jority and non-democratic procedures to promote more reason and less pas-
sion in government, and to rest public policies on a broader consensus in so-
ciety.243 
Even the Constitution’s most democratic element, the House of Repre-
sentatives, give states an advantage.  While the number of House seats de-
pends on the population, the Constitution grants them to the states by dis-
tricts.244  Only an allocation of seats by national party performance, where a 
Democratic nationwide victory of 60 percent would receive exactly 261 of the 
435 representatives, would follow majoritarianism perfectly.  Otherwise, the 
diversity of people, interests, and geography will produce uneven results 
across districts.  Imbalances in party performance in different districts, for 
example, could easily produce legislative majorities that do not reflect the 
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popular will.  Suppose rural and urban districts numbered roughly 50–50, but 
the Republican party won the former by slight margins, while the Democratic 
party ran up huge majorities in the latter.  In such a situation, the Republican 
party might achieve a majority of the House seats while losing in the overall 
popular vote.  Indeed, modern gerrymandering seeks to compact an oppo-
nent’s supporters into districts to win by larger margins, while spreading out 
one’s own supporters to win more districts, but by smaller margins.245  The 
Constitution vests the power to draw House districts in the state legislatures, 
subject to federal regulation, which recognizes state sovereign interests in the 
House.246 
Even in Britain’s parliamentary system, the use of geographic districts 
has yielded governments that won a majority of the seats without a majority 
of the population.247  Such a result is even more likely with more than two 
political parties, both in a parliamentary system and the Electoral College it-
self.248  Thanks to the third-party runs of Ross Perot, Bill Clinton handily won 
the Electoral College twice even though he won only 43 percent of the na-
tional vote in 1992 and 49 percent in 1996.249  In 1992, only a single state, 
Arkansas, provided a popular majority for any candidate.250  Eighty years ear-
lier, the third-party effort by former President Theodore Roosevelt swung the 
victory to Woodrow Wilson, who ran up 435 of the electors but only 41.8 
percent of the popular vote.251 
We should also not neglect the benefits of a state-based district system.  
Dispersing the power to choose the President into 50 states, with winner-take-
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all rules, tends to undermine the formation of large interest groups that can 
dictate the outcome.  Of course, such groups could form, and one might even 
argue that the two political parties are great “factions,” in the words of The 
Federalist No. 10,252 but coordinating their campaigns across the states nec-
essary to win 270 electoral votes presents greater costs and challenges than 
assembling a popular majority in the largest cities.253  In close elections, the 
Electoral College may give minorities an exaggerated influence in comparison 
to their national size.254  Because of the winner-take-all rule, a minority group 
in a critical state could swing the balance of its electoral votes, and hence the 
outcome of a close election.255  The flip-side of these tendencies also gives the 
candidates the incentive to bring together a broad, nationwide coalition that 
can compete in the different regions of the nation.256  A direct popular election 
would instead encourage the candidates to only campaign in the major cities 
of the east and west coasts.257  This is not to say that regional candidates could 
not prevail, as Lincoln demonstrated in 1860, but many (if not most) who have 
appealed solely to sectional interests have lost.258 
Other arguments in favor of the Electoral College, however, do not per-
suade as once they might have.  Some have observed that the system magni-
fies the political legitimacy of the president, because the winner-take-all rule 
transforms state pluralities into electoral vote majorities.259  Bill Clinton might 
win just 43 percent of the national vote, but his large Electoral College major-
ity gives him a political legitimacy he might otherwise lack.260  It seems un-
clear, however, whether presidents with large electoral majorities should have 
a false sense of confidence in their political support within the nation, nor 
whether the other branches should grant these chief executives the same po-
litical respect that might come with a large popular majority.261  Presidents 
elected by pluralities or slim majorities might pursue a course of cooperation 
with Congress, which might have a better claim to popular support, rather than 
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pressing an agenda born out of a false sense of electoral mandate.262 
Another argument in defense of the Electoral College makes much of cer-
tainty.  Supporters once claimed that the Constitution’s system provided a 
clear winner by the end of election night, due again to the winner-takes-all 
rule.263  Once a candidate reached enough states to get to 270 electoral votes, 
it no longer mattered to get the nationwide popular vote count precisely 
right.264  Under a direct popular election, however, a close election might re-
quire the exact vote count, which could lead to long delays or open the door 
to cheating or fraud.265  But the Bush v. Gore controversy showed that such 
concerns could afflict the Electoral College system too.266  A closely divided 
nation, as in 2000 or 2004 for that matter, brought the choice of president 
down to the results in a single state (Florida in 2000, Ohio in 2004).267  The 
Florida recount left the eventual outcome in doubt and required the Supreme 
Court to intervene to force the state to deliver its electoral votes by a federally-
mandated deadline.268  As Amar observes, if direct elections work just fine in 
statewide elections for governor, even of large states such as California, 
Texas, and New York, we can accept the same uncertainty for national elec-
tions too.269  Very close elections, however, might place the country in a state 
of uncertainty, which the nation cannot suffer for very long given the central 
role of the President for national security and law enforcement.270 
The broad-brush democracy criticism ultimately asks the wrong question.  
Simple majoritarianism is not in itself an instrumental success for govern-
ment; rather, we should ask whether the Electoral College advances other val-
ues in our Constitution’s republican system.  As we have seen, the Framers 
originally set out to block factional or regional candidates by creating a system 
in which only characters with a continent-wide reputation for public service 
could succeed.  As else in their design, they foresaw that a primary threat to 
the new government would come from faction.  Devices such as the separation 
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of powers responded to the evils after the Revolution, when simple majorities 
had taken over state governments and misused their powers to override indi-
vidual rights and enact special interest legislation.271  The Electoral College’s 
decentralization would allow only national figures to rise to the presidency, 
thereby shunting aside candidates who catered to a specific faction or re-
gion.272 
Donald Trump’s victory did not demonstrate the realization of the Found-
ers’ plans for the Electoral College, but its failures.  Early days had first born 
out Hamilton’s hopes in The Federalist No. 68 for choosing the President.273  
Despite the vicious partisan conflicts of the early 19th Century, our first Chief 
Executives were certainly the leading political figures of their day: George 
Washington won the nation’s independence on the battlefield; John Adams 
led the political fight for independence; Thomas Jefferson drafted the Decla-
ration of Independence and was governor of Virginia; James Madison drafted 
the Constitution and led the fight for ratification of the Constitution; James 
Monroe was Secretary of State and a leading Jeffersonian in Congress; John 
Quincy Adams was one of America’s greatest diplomats.  Even Andrew Jack-
son, who attacked the 1824 elections for going to the House after the Electoral 
College deadlocked, saved the nation in the 1814 Battle of New Orleans and 
added Florida to the union.274 
The United States also has had its runs of mediocre presidents, especially 
just before the Civil War and after Reconstruction.  The years 1850–1861 in-
cluded forgettable Chief Executives such as Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, 
and James Buchanan, while 1877–1896 witnessed weak Oval Office occu-
pants such as Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Grover 
Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison.  Average to poor performance in office, 
however, may owe more to circumstances than to ability.  Solving the crisis 
over slavery may have fallen beyond the ability of any American president 
until secession and Civil War brought Abraham Lincoln’s gifts to the fore.  
Exhaustion from Reconstruction and the economic boom of the Gilded Age 
may have demanded little from the Chief Executives.  These runs of medioc-
rity may have little to do with the Electoral College and everything to do with 
circumstance.  We see no great presidents in these eras because the nation did 
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not need greatness in its presidents.275 
Trump’s election, however, proved Hamilton wrong in his claim that the 
Electoral College would weed out the very worst candidates.  Between the 
Revolution and the Constitution, known by American historians as the Critical 
Period, leading nationalists grew concerned that unrestrained democracy in 
the states had led to instability in government, the invasion of individual 
rights, and the insecurity of property.276  Earlier “wholly popular” forms of 
government in ancient Greece and Rome and Renaissance Italy had suffered 
from similar “instability, injustice, and confusion.”277  Because they had such 
faith in the people, the Framers attributed such problems to unreflective ma-
jority rule––in other words, the passions, as opposed to reason––uncon-
strained by “a more perfect structure.”278  The Constitution would prevent the 
people from making rash decisions by hemming in the legislature with the 
executive and judicial branches.279  But the Presidency also raised the possi-
bility of demagogues, who could use their powers of persuasion to further 
mislead the people.280 
Hamilton admitted that demagogues might rise in a single state.  But he 
argued that such figures could not deceive the Electoral College, which rep-
resented the great breadth of the nation.281  “Talents for low intrigue, and the 
little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors 
in a single State,” Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 68.282  “[B]ut it will 
require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the es-
teem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it 
as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distin-
guished office of President of the United States.”283  The Framers could not 
have anticipated Donald Trump’s public life in more accurate terms.  “Talents 
 
 275.  See YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra note 100, at chs. 8–9.  
 276. See generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 4–6 (1984); 
WOOD, supra note 108, at 393–423. 
 277.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 252, at 77 (James Madison). 
 278.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 279. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (discuss-
ing the separation of powers between the three branches of government).  
 280. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (ac-
knowledging the history of tyrants and demagogues but arguing that the Constitution is the safest 
course to the liberty of the people). 
 281. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 96, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 282.  Id.  
 283.  Id.  
[Vol. 46: 833, 2019] A Defense of the Electoral College 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
868 
for low intrigue,” and “the little arts of popularity” describe a career founded 
on reality television, branding hotels and casinos, and appeals to some of the 
worst instincts in the electorate.  Trump seems to revel in tactical politics and 
driving the 24-hour news cycle, exactly as Hamilton feared in The Federalist 
No. 68. 
The Federalist assumed that a demagogue could not successfully appeal 
to the people in all of the states, separated as they were by the slowness of 
communications, the differences in political culture, and lack of knowledge 
of national affairs.  The Framers relied on these reasons, which had persuaded 
the Philadelphia Convention against direct popular election of the president, 
to protect the nation against a populist leader.  But they could not predict the 
changes in technology and media that have accelerated the instantaneous 
speed of information, the spread of a common political culture, and the na-
tionalization of politics through the Democrat and Republican parties.  The 
Framers also imagined that a demagogue would appeal to the people’s tem-
porary biases, so they designed a system that would dilute the popular voice.  
They believed that state interests would stand athwart populism, rather than 
raise up a populist candidate such as Trump. 
The Electoral College’s failure to filter out a candidate such as Trump, 
however, does not provide the basis for proposals for radical change.  One 
question worth asking is whether direct majoritarian election of a president 
would make the selection of a demagogue more or less likely.  Political phi-
losophers once thought direct democracy might make demagogues more 
likely—after all, the word refers to someone who is speaking to the people, 
the demos, for their support.284  A direct election would make the dema-
gogue’s path to power easier, by allowing him to win the presidency by ap-
pealing only to the inhabitants of the nation’s largest cities.285 
The non-constitutional practices that have grown up around the Electoral 
College have gone some way toward increasing the legitimacy of the winner.  
As political scientist James W. Ceaser argues, succeeding generations have 
built upon the Framer’s design to pursue different theories of presidential se-
lection.286  Jefferson soon replaced the Framer’s original vision with the idea 
that the presidential election would present a choice between policy 
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programs.287  Developed further by Martin Van Buren, this new approach re-
lied upon national political parties to present these platforms in each state, 
making the presidential election a choice on the issues.288  Political parties, 
however, would also constrain the presidents and moderate any rapid change 
in national politics.289  Seeking to burst partisan limitations on the presidency, 
Woodrow Wilson reversed the Framers’ starting point that the electoral sys-
tem should frustrate popular leaders.290  Instead, he saw the selection of a pres-
ident in a plebiscitary manner as the only way to clothe the president with the 
legitimacy to lead the nation in sweeping reform.291  Wilson’s views have pre-
vailed today: it was his idea that the people, rather than the parties, should 
control the nominating process; that the president should draw legitimacy for 
his agenda from his nationwide selection; and that the political party instead 
should help the president in enacting his program.292 
This is not to argue that direct national election of the President would 
not have the same features.  It certainly would, and probably in greater degree 
than the Electoral College.  But Ceasar shows that the Electoral College sys-
tem can promote these purposes too, thanks to the manner in which Jefferson, 
Van Buren, and Wilson have grafted their non-constitutional, political designs 
atop the Framers’ original design.  And perhaps the Electoral College does so 
without running as high a risk of demagogues or of a tyranny of the majority 
as direct popular election of a President.  In this respect, the Electoral College 
fits in with other aspects of the original constitutional design––the separation 
of powers, the Senate, and federalism––designed to limit government powers 
and to render political change difficult. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today’s opinion commentary joins many scholarly views to discard the 
Electoral College in favor of direct popular election.  They support a move-
ment, the NPV initiative, which asks state legislatures to replace the winner-
takes-all rule for assigning their electoral votes.  Instead of giving their elec-
toral votes to the winner of its own election, state legislatures under the NPV 
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movement would designate them for whomever wins the majority vote in the 
nation as a whole.  Thus, even if Trump won the election in a state that had 
adopted the NPV rule, the state would still assign the votes to Clinton because 
she won the majority of all votes in the country.  NPV strikes at the heart of 
the reason why the Electoral College favors the states over majority rule: the 
winner-take-all rule.  “The operation of the winner-take-all system results in 
effective massive disenfranchisement of voters supporting losing candidates,” 
write critics Lawrence Longley and Neal Peirce.293  Critics, however, often 
overlook that the Constitution does not require this feature of the presidential 
election, but that the issue remains with state legislatures. 
The NPV would effectively undo the spirit of the Electoral College, even 
though it would observe the letter of the Constitution, which leaves to the state 
legislatures the choice of electors.  It would have the states coordinate their 
right to choose the electors by simultaneously replacing winner-take-all with 
the national majority rule.  It would have a radical impact on presidential cam-
paigns.  Under the current rule, candidates have an incentive to win as many 
states as possible by 51 percent. Winning by larger margins suggests that a 
campaign spent too many resources that it could have better spent in a state 
where it lost by a close vote.294  As a result, winner-take-all encourages can-
didates to widen their campaigns to many states, and to build national coali-
tions that may serve to moderate their positions.295  They should spend little 
time in the friendliest and most hostile states and instead campaign hardest in 
the swing states that could go for either candidate.  Thus, in the 2016 elections, 
Trump should have spent little time in Texas or California; he won because 
he received bare majorities in states that had gone for Obama four years ear-
lier, such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. 
NPV would have the reverse effect.  It would encourage presidential can-
didates to campaign primarily in densely-populated cities and counties and to 
deepen their ideological commitment to the positions that most appeal to their 
voters.  Candidates would seek to run up the highest totals possible in their 
ideologically compatible states and ignore regions where they might have to 
moderate their positions.  Ironically, an NPV might produce the very result 
that led the Framers to reject direct popular election: candidates who 
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championed different regions of the nation. 
But the NPV suffers from a serious constitutional problem itself, because 
it only takes effect if a majority of states adopt the NPV rule—which may 
amount to an unconstitutional compact between the states that requires con-
gressional approval.  But putting this problem aside, the NPV would exacer-
bate, not alleviate, the problem posed by Trump’s election.  Trump is unusual 
because his populist movement found support in the states, rather than the 
nation as a whole.  The nation as a whole, however, did not embrace Hillary 
Clinton’s agenda, as it returned majorities for the Republican party in the 
House of Representatives, the Senate, and a majority of governorships and 
statehouses. 
Nevertheless, our constitutional system relies upon the state structure to 
dissipate and ultimately defuse rash popular movements—just as it success-
fully did with the original Populist moment in the late 19th Century.  Replac-
ing one of the Constitution’s elements of federalism might seem to respond to 
Trump’s 2016 victory, but it would make the rise of a future demagogue far 
more likely.  Under the NPV, a future populist need only appeal to urban ma-
jorities to win the presidency.  Overreaction to Trump could do far more long-
term harm to the Constitution than Trump could ever do. 
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